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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE GOVERNMENTAL
RECOVERY OF VETERANS' BENEFITS
Recipients of government pensions and similar benefits have gen-
erally been denied judicial review of governmental determinations made
in dispensing them.' When the present Veterans' Administration was
created in 1933, a provision barring review was included. The current
version of the statute, section 211 (a), reads as follows:
[D]ecisions of the Administrator on any question of law or
fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments under any
law administered by the Veterans' Administration shall be
final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the
United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any
such decision.2
At first glance this provision seems clear and all-encompassing. Never-
theless, in a recent decision, DiSilvestro v. United States,3 the Second
Circuit held that it did not prohibit review of the evidentiary basis for
a Veterans' Administration decision forming the foundation of the
Government's attempts to recover monies allegedly paid out in error
to the veteran.
Winning acceptance of this principle by the Second Circuit was
Mr. DiSilvestro's first, albeit probably pyrrhic, victory in twenty years
of litigation with the Government. To follow his name through the
federal reporters of the past two decades is to receive a thorough intro-
duction to judicial interpretation of section 211(a). Mr. DiSilvestro,
who always represents himself, includes among his many other credits
three petitions for certiorari, all rejected.4 This litigation has arisen
from his claim that a service-connected disability entitled him to a pen-
sion. After some initial skirmishing the pension was granted to him in
1948. In 1953, the Veterans' Administration became suspicious of
certain entries in DiSilvestro's records. His claim was rerated and
disallowed on the grounds that the entries were not authentic. In 1954,
after further investigation, the Veterans' Administration concluded that
DiSilvestro had falsified his records. They therefore declared a for-
I See notes 24 & 38 infra.
238 U.S.C. §211(a) (1964).
3 405 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968).
4 See, e.g., DiSilvestro v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 825, rehearing denied, 364 U.S. 897, rehearing denied, 364 U.S. 917
(1960); DiSilvestro v. United States Veterans' Administration, 151 F. Supp. 337
(E.D.N.Y. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 935, rehearing denied, 355 U.S. 968 (1958);
DiSilvestro v. United States Veterans' Administration, 132 F. Supp. 692 .(E.D.N.Y.
1955), aff'd, 228 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1009, rehearing denied,
351 U.S. 928 (1956). For a fuller account of the earlier history of the DiSilvestro
case, see F. Davis, Veterans' Benefits, Judicial Review, and the Constitutional Prob-
lems of "Positive" Government, 39 IND. L.J. 183, 190-94 (1964).
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feiture of his rights as a veteran and determined that he owed the
Government $2026.06 for funds already paid out to him.5
DiSilvestro's every effort to contest this action in the courts failed
because of section 211(a) and its predecessors.6  Thereafter the Gov-
ernment began withholding dividends to which he was entitled under a
National Service Life Insurance policy.7 DiSilvestro seized this oppor-
tunity to reassert his claim. He brought suit seeking (1) the withheld
dividends, (2) setting aside of the revocation of his disability award,
and (3) damages resulting from the wrongful denial of medical and
hospital care by the Veterans' Administration.8 The last two claims
were dismissed as res judicata.9 With regard to the first, the district
court held that review of the evidentiary basis of an affirmative govern-
ment claim was not barred by section 211(a). It then reviewed the
record in the forfeiture proceeding, since it assumed that it was the for-
feiture, rather than the initial rerating and disallowance of the award,
that created the Government's alleged right of setoff. The court sus-
tained the administrative finding that the relevant entries in the record
were not authentic, but granted summary judgment for DiSilvestro
because it found that the Government failed to sustain its burden of
proof that he had the capacity to form the intent necessary for fraud at
the time the records were altered.'0
On appeal, the Second Circuit also rejected the Government's con-
tention that section 211(a) should have been held to bar judicial re-
view." But it was a dubious victory for DiSilvestro, since the court
went on to agree with the Government that its setoff right was created
by the finding that payments had been made erroneously and did not
depend on the forfeiture proceeding and its finding of fraud. The dis-
trict court had already sustained the finding that the records were not
authentic. Nevertheless, the case was remanded, apparently for the
district court to decide whether there was substantial evidence in the
record to support the finding that but for the false records DiSilvestro
would not have been granted a disability award. 2
Buried in this curious and ironic history is the interesting question
whether in these circumstances the statute should be read to permit the
5405 F2d at 152. While a rerating merely involves a redetermination of the facts
of a recipient's case, leading to the conclusion that a former factual determination of
his status was erroneous, forfeiture is a statutory penalty for misconduct. The current
forfeiture provisions of the Veterans' Benefits Law are 38 U.S.C. §§ 3503-05 (1964).
6 See, e.g., cases cited note 4 supra.
7 A statute permits the Government to collect overpayments by setoff against
"benefits payable pursuant to any law administered by the Veterans' Administration
and relating to veterans . . . ." 38 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (1964). It has apparently been
assumed that this authorizes withholding dividends on National Service Life Insur-
ance policies.
8 DiSilvestro v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 516, 518 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
OId. at 519.
10 405 F2d at 153.
11 Id. at 154-55.
3-2 1d. at 155.
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Government to enforce a money judgment without the basis of its
claim ever being subject to judicial scrutiny. On this point the courts
are divided.'"
The language of the statute clearly bars judicial review of any
action of the Veterans' Administration denying benefits. Although the
District of Columbia Circuit has held otherwise, 14 the statute would
appear to bar judicial review of the revocation or forfeiture of benefits.
But the statute may be read to cover even a further situation. Where
the Government pays out money erroneously, it has a right to recover
it, even in the absence of a statute creating such a right. 5 It is not clear
from the language of the statute whether or not Congress intended to
bar judicial review of the legal and factual determinations of the Admin-
istration underlying such an affirmative governmental claim. Nor is
the question resolved by the legislative history of the section.
There is now little doubt of the constitutionality of barring judicial
review of administrative decisions granting or denying benefits.'" An
explicit no-review section has been a feature of the scheme of the
Veterans' Administration ever since its inception, and attacks on the
section have not been successful.' But there are very serious doubts
about the propriety of denying judicial review of administrative de-
cisions giving the Government a right of recovery.' Such doubts can-
not be dispelled simply because, as was the case in DiSilvestro, the same
determinations of which review is sought would properly be unreview-
able were the question limited to the denial or revocation of benefits.
When in 1953 the Veterans' Administration determined that payments
to DiSilvestro had been made erroneously, he lost the right to further
benefits. The loss of this right was unreviewable.' The same finding
created a right of recovery in the Government for payments already
13 See United States v. Gibson, 207 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1953) (permitting review),
rev'd on other grounds, 225 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1955); Gongora v. United States,
183 F. Supp. 872 (D.D.C. 1960); United States v. Lawrence, 154 F. Supp. 454
(D. Mont. 1957); United States v. Owens, 147 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Ark. 1957);
Hormel v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); cf. Tracy v. Gleason,
379 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1967). But see United States v. Mroch, 88 F2d 888 (6th
Cir. 1937) (refusing review); United States v. Oxner, 229 F. Supp. 58 (E.D.
Ark. 1964) ; United States v. Rhode, 189 F. Supp. 842 (D.S.D. 1960) ; United States
v. Crockett, 158 F. Supp. 460 (D. Me. 1958) ; United States v. Perry, 141 F. Supp.
443 (E.D.N.C. 1956).
14 Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1967); 81 HARv. L. REv. 1861
(1968).
15United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 415 (1938); Grand Trunk W. Ry. v.
United States, 252 U.S. 112, 120-21 (1920); DiSilvestro v. United States, 405 F2d
150, 155 (1968) ; Stone v. United States, 286 F2d 56, 58-59 (8th Cir. 1961).
16 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934) ; L. JAFFE, JuDiIu. CONTROL
OF ADMINIsTRATvE AcTION 382-83 (1965). But see F. Davis, Veterans' Benefits,
Judicial Review, and the Constitutional Problems of "Positive" Government, 39 IND.
L.J. 183 (1964); cf. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785-86 (1964).
'7 See, e.g., Strong v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 468 (D. Mass. 1957), appeal
dismissed, 356 U.S. 226 (1958).
18 See text accompanying note 45 infra.
'9 But see Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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made. To deny judicial review to the extent of scrutinizing the record
to see if the result was supported by substantial evidence (which was
what the court required in DiSilvestro) might constitute a deprivation
of property without due process of law. The correct reading of the
statute, therefore, is one which avoids this question.
A. The Language and Legislative History of the No-Review Clause
Section 211 (a) is the latest version of section 5 of the Economy
Act of 1933, which created the present Veterans' Administration. The
language of the Act was very broad:
All decisions rendered by the Administrator of Veterans'
Affairs under the provisions of this title . . . shall be final
and conclusive on all questions of law and fact, and no other
official or court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
review by mandamus or otherwise any such decision."
A broader statute, not limited to the provisions of the 1933 Act, was
enacted in 1940, using slightly different language:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law . . . the de-
cisions of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs on any ques-
tion of law or fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments
under this or any other Act administered by the Veterans'
Administration shall be final and conclusive and no other
official or any court of the United States shall have power or
jurisdiction to review any such decisions.2
In 1957, with the consolidation of the Veterans' Benefits legislation, the
two prior versions of the statute were replaced by the current section
211 (a).'
These changes in language are not very significant, and courts
have paid them little attention.2 They certainly have no obvious
bearing on the question of reviewability of affirmative governmental
claims.
The accompanying legislative history is not much more helpful.
The Economy Act of 1933 was passed under crisis conditions with al-
20 Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 3, § 5, 48 Stat. 9.
2 1 Act of Oct. 17, 1940, ch. 893, § 11, 54 Stat. 1197.
2 2 Veterans' Benefits Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-56, §211 (a), 71 Stat. 92, as
amended, 38 U.S.C. § 211 (a) (1964). The Congressional reports express the view that
the change was merely one of consolidation; they give no indication of any change
in the purpose of § 211(a). See H.R. REP. No. 279, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1957);
S. REP. No. 332, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1957).
23See, e.g., Hahn v. Gray, 203 F2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (contention that 1940
amendment was intended to mitigate harshness of 1933 act by permitting review
in some circumstances rejected). But see Hospoder v. United States, 209 F2d 427
(3d Cir. 1953) (omission of reference to mandamus in 1940 act taken as permitting
review in some circumstances).
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most no legislative consideration 2 4 It has been suggested that one
immediate purpose in denying judicial review was a critical need for
governmental economy. 5 Even if this is true, denial of judicial review
was already an accepted feature of veterans' benefits law, and reflected
more permanent administrative policy."' When amendment of the
no-review provisions was contemplated in 1952, the Administrator
wrote a letter to the subcommittee considering the amendment, which
set forth both the policy behind the existing law and the reasons for its
retention. 27  The letter first outlined as "the policy of the Government"
the old maxim that there is no right to judicial review of the denial of
governmental "bounty." '8 The more concrete reasons offered were
that the administration of veterans' benefits involved questions of great
technical complexity which an agency could handle more adequately and
with greater uniformity than could the courts; and that allowing judicial
review would be costly, both in terms of the burden on the courts and
the expense of defending the suits.
This policy analysis does little to answer the question whether the
no-review clause was intended to apply in situations where the Govern-
ment is seeking affirmative relief. Insofar as it indicates a broad
policy of barring review, it suggests that no determination of the
Veterans' Administration should ever be reviewable. On the other
hand, it is difficult to see how a narrow exception to the broad rule,
24 The 1933 Act was introduced in the House in the afternoon of Friday, March
10. It was considered in committee for 5 minutes. The next day it was debated for
2 hours and passed. 77 CoNG. REc. 198, 223 (1933). It received little more consid-
eration in the Senate, although it was there stated that § 5 "gives to the Veterans'
Administration only such authority as the Administrator now has." Id. 254.
The 1940 Act received little more consideration. An objection to the no-review
clause was silenced by the answer that such an objection might destroy the entire
bill, and that the bill contained important benefit provisions which must be passed.
86 CONG. REc. 13490 (1940). It was, however, explained in the Senate that
the bill only confirms what has been the accepted belief and conviction, that
with respect to any pension, [or] gratuity, . . . there is no right of action
in the courts . . . . It is not so much a limitation as a restatement of what
is believed to be the law upon the question.
Id. 13383. The debate in the House added that
[the provision] is desirable for the purpose of uniformity and to make clear
what is believed to be the intention of Congress that the various laws shall
be uniformly administered in accordance with the liberal policies governing the
Veterans' Administration.
Id. 13491.
25See F. Davis, Veterans' Benefits, Judicial Review, and the Constitutional
Problems of "Positive" Government, 39 IND. L.J. 183, 188 (1964): "Times were
difficult, and it was thought that the country could not afford to waste money and
time quibbling over legal technicalities in court." While this may be a satisfactory
explanation of the features of the 1933 act which reduced existing benefits, it appears
there may have been other reasons for the no-review provision even in 1933. See
note 24 supra.
2 See note 24 supra.
2 7Hearings on HR. 360, 478, 2442 & 6777 Before a Subcommn. of the House
Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. at 1961-63 (1952) [hereinafter
cited as 1952 Hearings].
28 See notes 24, 38 & text accompanying notes 38-43 infra.
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limited to situations in which the Government seeks a money judgment,
would run counter to the stated policies. While a payment may be
"bounty" when made, it is the property of the veteran when the Govern-
ment seeks thereafter to recover it. Moreover, the volume of such cases
would presumably be very small, involving little expense.2 9 No inter-
ference with the Veterans' Administration's evolved standards for deal-
ing with the difficult technical problems presented need be feared; the
scope of judicial review can be limited to the Government's right to
recovery, without affecting the veteran's right to receive benefits in
the future.
Furthermore, the language of the statute is readily susceptible to
the creation of such an exception. Most of the courts which have held
for the Government on this issue have simply accepted the breadth of
the statute as controlling this and every other situation.3" However,
those courts which have permitted judicial review have had no difficulty
with the statutory language. The usual argument is that where the
Government seeks to recover payments already made, this does not in-
volve a "claim" within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the
underlying decision of the Veterans' Administration is not within the
no-review provision.- This argument is serviceable rather than con-
vincing. While it is true that a government claim is not a "claim"
within the meaning of the statute, review of the evidentiary basis of the
Government's claim necessarily involves examination of a prior decision
"of the Administrator on [a] question of law or fact concerning a claim
of benefits." 32 A possible response to this contention is that once the
court finds that the claim before it is not within the meaning of the
statute, the statute becomes inapplicable, and the court need not be con-
cerned that it is in fact reviewing a prior decision of the Administrator.
The resolution of the issue should not, however, turn on such niceties.
The essential point is that, for the purposes of a defendant trying to
secure judicial review of a government claim against him, the language
of the statute is by no means fatally unpliable.
29In fiscal 1965, the Board of Veterans' Appeals disposed of 22,798 claims.
16,784 of these were denied. ADmiNISTRATOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT
1965, table 91, at 309 (1965). In the 1952 hearings, it was estimated that the Board
of Appeals was at that time hearing approximately 52,000 cases a year. The Adminis-
trator declared himself unable to estimate how many of these cases would be appealed
to the courts if all Veterans' Administration decisions were made reviewable. 1952
Hearings 1963. Representative Ervins was willing to guess that about 1,000 cases
would be appealed to the courts if the law were changed. Id. 1991. Evidently,
a rule universally adopted in 1969 that Administration decisions underlying affirmative
government claims were entitled to judicial review would not flood the federal courts
with excessive litigation.
30 See, e.g., United States v. Mroch, 88 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1937) ; United States
v. Oxner, 229 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Ark. 1964) ; United States v. Rhode, 189 F. Supp.
842 (D.S.D. 1960).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 207 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1953), rev'd on other
grounds, 225 F2d 807 (9th Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Lawrence, 154 F. Supp. 454
(D. Mont. 1957) ; Hormel v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; cf.
Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
32 38 U.S.C. § 211 (a) (1964).
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B. Reviewability: Presumptively and Constitutionally Required
On the whole, the opinions which have allowed review of Veterans'
Administration decisions underlying affirmative government claims
have not been distinguished by depth of analysis. It is tempting to re-
gard these cases as nothing more than illustrations of Professor Davis's
remark that "a court with a strong enough will to correct what it be-
lieves to be injustice can usually contrive a way around even a statutory
withdrawal of the court's jurisdiction." 3 Even courts faced with suits
clearly barred by section 211 (a) often supplement their reliance on the
section with an alternative holding that the veteran would lose on the
merits. 4 Decisions which refuse to apply section 211(a) to govern-
ment claims generally make very clear their disagreement with the
merits of the administrative determinations involved.35 DiSilvestro was
exceptional in this respect: despite the fact that the court insisted on
judicial review, DiSilvestro's claim was a weak one, and the case was
remanded for determination of an issue on which he was almost bound
to lose.30
There are of course grounds for decision other than the immediate
hardship in a given individual case. Professor Jaffe has written that
"an individual whose interest is acutely and immediately affected by an
administrative action presumptively has a right to secure at some point
a judicial determination of its validity." 3 Such a presumption in most
veterans' benefit cases is destroyed by the existence of section 211 (a).
But the statute is a codification of the old notion that dispensation of
government largesse need not be subject to judicial process.8 The
presumption must therefore revive at the periphery of the statute's
coverage, in the absence of any conflict with the section's other adminis-
trative policies. This is most clearly true in the case in which the
Government is pressing its claim against a veteran. In this situation,
there is no question of the receipt of any bounty, and a most palpable
interest of the individual is affected: an attempt is being made to extract
a money judgment from him.
Akin to the presumption of reviewability are some vaguely defined
constitutional limitations on the lengths to which Congress can go in
334 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TRE TIsa §28.15, at 78 (1958).
34 See, e.g., Hahn v. Gray, 203 F2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Contra, Tracy v.
Gleason, 379 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (review of forfeiture allowed where forfeiture
was based on failure of veteran confined as a homicidal lunatic to fill out and return
questionnaire).
35 See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 207 F,2d 161 (9th Cir. 1953), rev'd on other
grounds, 225 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1955) (record failed to show dual payments were
made on account of administrative oversight) ; United States v. Owens, 147 F. Supp.
309 (E.D. Ark. 1957) (record failed to sustain claim that veteran knowingly misstated
income since V.A. income reporting form did not make clear that income from credit
sales was to be reported at time of sale and not of receipt) ; Gongora v. United
States, 183 F. Supp. 872 (D.D.C. 1960) (Government's contention that plaintiff's bus-
band had not been in the army rejected because a certificate that he had been in the
army was submitted after the V.A. ruling).3 6 See text accompanying note 12 stipra.
3" L. JAFFE, JUDICI-L CONTROL OF ADmiNISTRATIVE ACTION 336 (1965).3 8See note 24 snpra; 1952 Hearings 1973-81.
VETERANS' BENEFITS
denying judicial review of administrative action. The law on this
question cannot be stated with much confidence. The Government
almost never seeks to move against individual interests while attempting
to block judicial review. Occasionally it does so, almost fortuitously,
in cases involving relatively minor interests; such is the case with re-
covery of overpayments of veterans' benefits. In these cases courts do
not give much attention to the enormously complex issues of principle
involved.89 While this may not be a very serious failure, a greater
awareness of the problem, even if it is unlikely to produce definitive
answers to the questions involved, supports a reading of section 211 (a)
which avoids constitutional doubts.
Relatively settled, though frequently attacked,4" is the proposition
that
[t]he United States is not, by the creation of claims
against itself, bound to provide a remedy in the courts. It may
withhold all remedy or it may provide an administrative
remedy and make it exclusive, however mistaken its exercise.41
The basis of this doctrine is highly theoretical.' It seems to lie partly
in the notion that where Government performs functions, the nature and
39 The § 211 (a) cases which considered the constitutional issue, see, e.g., United
States v. Lawrence, 154 F. Supp. 454 (D. Mont. 1957) ; United States v. Owens,
147 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Ark. 1957); Hormel v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 806
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), have tended to treat it in fairly general terms. The most thorough
discussion is in Owens, which argues that barring review of government claims would
open the door to administrative arbitrariness and discrimination, that allowing the Gov-
ernment to be the judge of its own case would "be repugnant to fundamental notions of
fair play," and that the statute should be construed to avoid constitutional "doubts."
40 See, e.g., F. Davis, Veterans' Benefits, Judicial Review, and the Constitutional
Problems of "Positive" Government, 39 IND. L.J. 183 (1964); cf. Reich, The New
Property, 73 YaL.n L.J. 733 (1964); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAgv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
41 Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1936).
42 It is frequently pointed out that it does not correspond very closely with real
life. During the hearings on the proposed amendment to the no-review provision in
1952, Representative Rogers stated:
I cannot get my thinking to the place where if a man goes into the defense
of this country and gets a leg shot off or gets some disease or some injury,
that the Government is giving him anything, because he gave up quite a bit.
As a matter of fact, the consideration that he is paid from what I think
would ripen into a right is more than is present in most contract situations.
1952 Hearings 1986.
In discussing the kindred notion that administrative remedies in the dispensing
of benefits presumptively exclude judicial review, Professor Jaffe states:
The notion of "privilege" is in this context a perversion of thought and
of language. Pensions and annuities are created under a system of law, usually
for service given or other sufficient reason; they are paid out of the tax
funds to which all individuals including the claimants have contributed. As
Government takes over more and more services and amenities, and to finance
them takes a larger and larger part of the citizen's dollar, it is both absurd
and dangerous to look upon these services as "privileges." It is precisely
in a field such as this, in which vast numbers of the citizenry are deeply
affected in their daily life, that the rule of law is most pertinent. Though it
may be appropriate in certain situations to exclude judicial review, it is not
sound to infer exclusion on the basis that the claim is a "privilege."
JAFFE, supra note 37, at 369.
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manner of which are not constitutionally compelled, and especially where
such functions consist of giving out what is thought to be in the nature
of charity, it may provide for their execution in whatever way it
chooses. 3 Similarly the recipient of benefits is not thought to have a
claim on the attention of the courts which reaches constitutional dimen-
sions. Nothing is being taken from him; he is not being made to do
anything. He is simply complaining to the court that the Government
will not give him "bounty."
Whatever the merits of this theory, its applicability is open to
question in the case of a statute barring judicial review of a Govern-
ment claim for recovery of overpayments. United States v. Rhode,
one of the cases upholding the application of section 211(a) to the
recovery of overpayments by the Government, states that "[v]ested
rights are not involved in this case. The record deals with overpayment
of a veteran's benefit. Such benefits are gratuities." "' The suggestion
apparently is that the status of the veteran's claim to amounts in his
possession corresponding to those already received as benefits is no
different than that of his claim to receive benefits in the future: the
Veterans' Administration can dispose of either without judicial review.
This poses the question whether the government claim is to be seen
merely as a kind of accounting adjustment or as a cause of action for
the recovery of money. The Government is authorized by statute to
recover overpayments by charging them against funds in its possession
which it would otherwise pay out; it is therefore not immediately com-
pelled to go to court. It may be argued that since it could proceed
without a court, there should be no requirement of judicial review of
the merits when, for some reason, it chooses to seek a judgment. But
the fact that the Government does proceed by seeking a judgment from
a court must itself make a difference. If the notions of due process and
of the nature of the judicial function mean anything, they must require
a court to examine questions of law, including the question of the sub-
stantiality of the evidence underlying the judgment it is being asked to
give, where no other court has yet done so.45
Furthermore, where the Government does proceed by self-help, as
in DiSilvestro, it is not clear that judicial review is not required.
Professor Hart puts the question but never really answers it." The
43 Van Alstyne, supra note 40, at 1442 n.11.
44 189 F. Supp. 842, 844 (D.S.D. 1960).
45 See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HAv. L. REv. 1362, 1375-79 (1953); cf. JAFFE, supra
note 37, at 384:
We can then conclude that, when a person is the object of an adininistra-
tive order which will be enforced by a writ levying upon his property or
person, he is at some point entitled to a judicial test of legality.
46
Suppose Congress authorizes a program of direct action by Government
officials against private persons or private property. Suppose, further, that it
not only dispenses with judicial enforcement but either limits the jurisdiction
[Vo1.118:288
VETERANS' BENEFITS
interest of the injured individual is the same, regardless of whether the
Government sues him or withholds other funds and compels him to
sue it. But where the individual is suing the Government, he must
overcome the obstacle presented by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
4 7
The usual form of such litigation is a suit for National Service Life
Insurance dividends, which is specifically authorized by statute.48 Sec-
tion 211 (a) may be read as an exception to such authorization. Since
the suit is clearly a suit for money against the United States, it falls
in the area where the much criticized doctrine of sovereign immunity
is still thought to have the most vitality.4" But to deny judicial review
would be to rely on the power of Congress to regulate the jurisdiction
of the federal courts, and on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, to
reach a result which courts should properly take pains to avoid: it
would establish the constitutional power of the Government, at least in
some circumstances, to deprive an individual of vested rights without
judicial process. The technique of statutory construction is readily
available to avoid such a holding, and it should be used. 0
CONCLUSION
The proper construction of section 211 (a) is one which permits
judicial review of government claims of prior erroneous payment. This
raises the question whether a judicial decision favorable to the veteran
should also bind the Veterans' Administration concerning prospective
payments to the veteran. If DiSilvestro had established that the record
did not contain substantial evidence that the relevant records were not
of the federal courts to inquire into what the officials do or denies it
altogether.
Hart, supra note 45, at 1387.
Professor Hart goes on to suggest that the answer is that the court should examine
the Government's action on the merits, and if it is invalid to declare the jurisdictional
limitation invalid and proceed under its general grant of jurisdiction. Id. But this
argument does not face the problems raised by the situation in which the individual's
complaint is one that will only be satisfied by the payment of money by the Govern-
ment, and in which the doctrine of sovereign immunity may therefore be applicable.
47 See generally JAFFE, supra note 37, at 197-231; Carrow, Sovereign Immunity in
Administrative Law-a New Diagnosis, 9 J. PuB. L. 1 (1960).
48 38 U.S.C. § 784 (1964).
49 E.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). But see Carrow, supra note 47, at
13-17.
50 Cf. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934). The beneficiaries of govern-
ment insurance policies sued for amounts due thereunder. The Economy Act of 1933
had repealed all acts pertaining to the insurance policies involved. The question was
whether the beneficiaries had thus been deprived of property without due process of
law, although reference was also made to the fifth amendment prohibition on taking
property without just compensation. The Court held that the policies were contracts
creating vested rights. It distinguished between the rights and the remedy. While
the Government could withdraw its consent to be sued without (in a constitutional
sense) impairing the rights involved, the Court held that Congress intended to abrogate
the right rather than to withdraw the remedy, and it therefore held for the beneficiaries.
The curious reasoning is a good example of the reluctance of courts to ascribe to
Congress an intent to use the doctrine of sovereign immunity to make ineffective what
would otherwise be constitutional rights. Hart, supra note 45, at 1371.
1969]
298 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.118:288
authentic, should the court have directed the Veterans' Administration
to resume payments? On the question of his right to future payments,
there would be nothing to distinguish such a case from any other in
which the veteran asserts that the Administration's decision denying
him benefits is erroneous. Section 211(a) is clearly applicable and
there is no countervailing constitutional limitation. Judicial review
should be given effect only to the Government's claim, and not to the
right to future payments.
